Title :
Trade Credit Contracts under Asymmetric Information
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Econ. & Manage., Shanghai Maritime Univ., Shanghai, China
Abstract :
In trade credit, supplier allows retailer delay payment with some interest rate. For retailers have private information, supplier should provide different contracts to retailers with respect totheir type. We analysis the trade credit contract under the condition that the supplier can observe imprecise signal of the retailers´ type, and give the contracts which the supplier should provide.
Keywords :
credit transactions; supply chains; asymmetric information; interest rate; retailer delay payment; supplier; trade credit contracts; Conference management; Contracts; Costs; Delay; Economic indicators; Management information systems; Production; Signal analysis; Supply chains; Wireless networks; financial constraint; supply chain; trade credit;
Conference_Titel :
Wireless Networks and Information Systems, 2009. WNIS '09. International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Shanghai
Print_ISBN :
978-0-7695-3901-0
Electronic_ISBN :
978-1-4244-5400-6
DOI :
10.1109/WNIS.2009.85