• DocumentCode
    3136795
  • Title

    Incentive compatible mechanism design for synthetic task allocation in virtual organizations

  • Author

    He, Linli ; Ioerger, Thomas R.

  • Author_Institution
    Dept. of Comput. Sci., Texas A & M Univ., College Station, TX, USA
  • fYear
    2005
  • fDate
    April 18-21, 2005
  • Firstpage
    205
  • Lastpage
    210
  • Keywords
    cooperative systems; incentive schemes; task analysis; virtual enterprises; agent cooperation; algorithmic mechanism design optimization problem; computational organizational models; incentive compatible mechanism design; organizational agents; synthetic task allocation; virtual organizations; Computational modeling; Computer science; Design optimization; Engineering management; Finishing; Helium; Internet; Productivity; Project management; Resource management;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Integration of Knowledge Intensive Multi-Agent Systems, 2005. International Conference on
  • Print_ISBN
    0-7803-9013-X
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/KIMAS.2005.1427081
  • Filename
    1427081
    • Link To Document
    https://search.isc.ac/dl/search/defaultta.aspx?DTC=49&DC=3136795