DocumentCode
3174108
Title
The study on engineering supervision incentive system based on asymmetric information
Author
Cao, Yugui ; Wang, Huanhuan
Author_Institution
Coll. of Manage. & Econ., North China Univ. of Water Resources & Electr. Power, Zhengzhou, China
fYear
2011
fDate
8-10 Aug. 2011
Firstpage
3559
Lastpage
3562
Abstract
The principal-agent model between employers and engineering supervisors is established, considering such factors as the scale of employers´ investment, special character of engineering supervisors and exogenous random variable and its influence. And the influence of these factors on the sensitiveness of compensation performance under asymmetric information is analyzed. Based on the result, factors to be considered while establishing the incentive system of engineering supervisors are put forward.
Keywords
human resource management; incentive schemes; investment; asymmetric information; compensation performance; employer investment; engineering supervision incentive system; engineering supervisor; exogenous random variable; principal-agent model; Companies; Contracts; Economics; Integrated circuits; Investments; Random variables; Remuneration; employer; engineering supervision; incentive system; principal-agent;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Artificial Intelligence, Management Science and Electronic Commerce (AIMSEC), 2011 2nd International Conference on
Conference_Location
Deng Leng
Print_ISBN
978-1-4577-0535-9
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/AIMSEC.2011.6010600
Filename
6010600
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