Dual game in state-owned enterprise property right evolution in China

Author

Peng, Han

Author_Institution

Sch. of Econ. & Manage., Henan Polytech. Univ., Jiaozuo, China

fYear

2011

fDate

8-10 Aug. 2011

Firstpage

2069

Lastpage

2072

Abstract

The privatization reform of state-owned companies has been drawing much attention in the past 30-odd years of reform and opening-up. Based on the complete information dynamic game theory, the present paper introduces three factors to the decision-making function, namely, the knowledge of institution, the acceptability of ideology, and the pressure of unemployment. It attempts to explain the whole course of state-owned companies´ property right evolution with endogenous mechanism, and advances that the property right reform of the state-owned enterprise would have an optimistic prospect of all-privatized situation.

Keywords

decision making; game theory; industrial property; organisational aspects; privatisation; China; all-privatized situation; decision-making function; dual game; ideology acceptability; information dynamic game theory; institutional knowledge; privatization reform; state-owned company; state-owned enterprise property right evolution; unemployment; Companies; Government; Mathematical model; Mechanical factors; Privatization; Unemployment; game; government decision-maker; manager; property right evolution; state-owned enterprises;

fLanguage

English

Publisher

ieee

Conference_Titel

Artificial Intelligence, Management Science and Electronic Commerce (AIMSEC), 2011 2nd International Conference on

Conference_Location

Deng Leng

Print_ISBN

978-1-4577-0535-9

Type

conf

DOI

10.1109/AIMSEC.2011.6011148

Filename

6011148