• DocumentCode
    3217362
  • Title

    Constant-round coin-tossing with a man in the middle or realizing the shared random string model

  • Author

    Barak, Boaz

  • Author_Institution
    Dept. of Comput. Sci., Weizmann Inst. of Sci., Rehovot, Israel
  • fYear
    2002
  • fDate
    2002
  • Firstpage
    345
  • Lastpage
    355
  • Abstract
    We present the first constant-round non-malleable commitment scheme and the first constant-round non-malleable zero-knowledge argument system, as defined by Dolev, Dwork and Naor (1991). Previous constructions either used a non-constant number of rounds, or were only secure under stronger setup assumptions. An example of such an assumption is the shared random string model where we assume all parties have access to a reference string that was chosen uniformly at random by a trusted dealer. We obtain these results by defining an adequate notion of non-malleable coin-tossing, and presenting a constant-round protocol that satisfies it. This protocol allows us to transform protocols that are non-malleable in (a modified notion of) the shared random string model into protocols that are non-malleable in the plain model (without any trusted dealer or setup assumptions). Observing that known constructions of a non-interactive non-malleable zero-knowledge argument systems in the shared random string model (De Santis et. al., 2001) are in fact non-malleable in the modified model, and combining them with our coin-tossing protocol we obtain the results mentioned above. The techniques we use are different from those used in previous constructions of non-malleable protocols. In particular our protocol uses diagonalization and a non-black-box proof of security (in a sense similar to Barak´s zero-knowledge argument (2001)).
  • Keywords
    probability; security of data; transport protocols; constant-round nonmalleable commitment scheme; constant-round nonmalleable zero-knowledge argument system; diagonalization; setup assumptions; shared random string model; Access protocols; Communication channels; Communication system control; Computer science; Cryptographic protocols; Cryptography; Security; Terminology;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Foundations of Computer Science, 2002. Proceedings. The 43rd Annual IEEE Symposium on
  • ISSN
    0272-5428
  • Print_ISBN
    0-7695-1822-2
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/SFCS.2002.1181957
  • Filename
    1181957