A differentiated pricing mechanism for idle resources allocation in reservation clouds

Author

Jiang Fu ; Pingping Yao ; Kaiyang Liu ; Jun Peng

Author_Institution

Sch. of Inf. Sci. & Eng., Central South Univ., Beijing, China

fYear

2015

fDate

23-25 May 2015

Firstpage

4236

Lastpage

4241

Abstract

In cloud computing, Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) cloud providers can offer two types of renting plans for Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) clouds, including on-demand plan and reservation plan. The SaaS cloud provider prefers reservation plan for its cheaper price. However, it may cause highly unused capacity without the knowledge of future demands. Therefore, how to improve the utilization of the idle reserved resources is a critical issue. To address this issue, a novel leasing mechanism based on the non-cooperative game is investigated to reallocate the redundant resources. Then to further increase the profit SaaS clouds, a differentiated pricing scheme is proposed. Numerical simulation results indicate that the proposed scheme can improve the profit of SaaS cloud provider and reduce the cost of end users.

Keywords

cloud computing; cost reduction; game theory; pricing; resource allocation; IaaS cloud provider; SaaS cloud provider; cloud computing; cost reduction; differentiated pricing mechanism; idle resources allocation; infrastructure-as-a-service; leasing mechanism; noncooperative game; numerical simulation; on-demand plan; reservation cloud; reservation plan; resource utilization; software-as-a-service; Cloud computing; Computational modeling; Games; Optimization; Pricing; Resource management; Software as a service; Cloud computing; Differentiated pricing; Non-cooperative game; Reservation;

fLanguage

English

Publisher

ieee

Conference_Titel

Control and Decision Conference (CCDC), 2015 27th Chinese

Conference_Location

Qingdao

Print_ISBN

978-1-4799-7016-2

Type

conf

DOI

10.1109/CCDC.2015.7162648

Filename

7162648