Title :
A bound on attacks on payment protocols
Author :
Stoller, Scott D.
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Comput. Sci., State Univ. of New York, Stony Brook, NY, USA
Abstract :
Electronic payment protocols are designed to work correctly in the presence of an adversary that can prompt honest principals to engage in an unbounded number of concurrent instances of the protocol. This paper establishes an upper bound on the number of protocol instances needed to attack a large class of protocols, which contains versions of some well-known electronic payment protocols, including SET and 1KP. Such bounds clarify the nature of attacks on and provide a rigorous basis for automated verification of payment protocols
Keywords :
electronic money; formal verification; protocols; security of data; 1KP; SET; Secure Electronic Transactions; adversary; attack bound; automated verification; concurrent protocol instances; electronic payment protocols; honest principals; upper bound; Computer science; Electronic mail; History; Protocols; Security; Space exploration; State-space methods; Upper bound; Yarn;
Conference_Titel :
Logic in Computer Science, 2001. Proceedings. 16th Annual IEEE Symposium on
Conference_Location :
Boston, MA
Print_ISBN :
0-7695-1281-X
DOI :
10.1109/LICS.2001.932483
