• DocumentCode
    3223122
  • Title

    A bound on attacks on payment protocols

  • Author

    Stoller, Scott D.

  • Author_Institution
    Dept. of Comput. Sci., State Univ. of New York, Stony Brook, NY, USA
  • fYear
    2001
  • fDate
    2001
  • Firstpage
    61
  • Lastpage
    70
  • Abstract
    Electronic payment protocols are designed to work correctly in the presence of an adversary that can prompt honest principals to engage in an unbounded number of concurrent instances of the protocol. This paper establishes an upper bound on the number of protocol instances needed to attack a large class of protocols, which contains versions of some well-known electronic payment protocols, including SET and 1KP. Such bounds clarify the nature of attacks on and provide a rigorous basis for automated verification of payment protocols
  • Keywords
    electronic money; formal verification; protocols; security of data; 1KP; SET; Secure Electronic Transactions; adversary; attack bound; automated verification; concurrent protocol instances; electronic payment protocols; honest principals; upper bound; Computer science; Electronic mail; History; Protocols; Security; Space exploration; State-space methods; Upper bound; Yarn;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Logic in Computer Science, 2001. Proceedings. 16th Annual IEEE Symposium on
  • Conference_Location
    Boston, MA
  • ISSN
    1043-6871
  • Print_ISBN
    0-7695-1281-X
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/LICS.2001.932483
  • Filename
    932483
    • Link To Document
    https://search.isc.ac/dl/search/defaultta.aspx?DTC=49&DC=3223122