SEED masking implementations against power analysis attacks

Author

Lu, Y. ; Boey, K. -H ; Hodgers, P. ; O´Neill, M.

Author_Institution

Inst. of ECIT, Queen´´s Univ. Belfast, Belfast, UK

fYear

2010

fDate

6-9 Dec. 2010

Firstpage

1199

Lastpage

1202

Abstract

Electronics cryptographic devices can be attacked by monitoring physical characteristics released from their circuits, such as power consumption and electromagnetic emanation. These techniques are known as Side Channel Attacks (SCAs). The Differential Power Analysis (DPA) is one of the most effective SCAs, which can reveal the secret key from the dependency between power consumption of the device and the processed data. This paper presents the first masking countermeasure implementation on SEED encryption algorithm. Two masking schemes are applied to SEED in this work. The implementation results are compared.

Keywords

cryptography; field programmable gate arrays; power aware computing; DPA; SCA; SEED masking implementations; differential power analysis; electronic cryptographic devices; power analysis attacks; power consumption; side channel attacks; Algorithm design and analysis; Application specific integrated circuits; Encryption; Field programmable gate arrays; Information security; Power demand; Countermeasure; DPA; SCA; SEED;

fLanguage

English

Publisher

ieee

Conference_Titel

Circuits and Systems (APCCAS), 2010 IEEE Asia Pacific Conference on

Conference_Location

Kuala Lumpur

Print_ISBN

978-1-4244-7454-7

Type

conf

DOI

10.1109/APCCAS.2010.5775039

Filename

5775039