• DocumentCode
    3253751
  • Title

    Study on game among government and construction units about green engineering

  • Author

    Fu, Li ; Huang, Wen-Jie

  • Author_Institution
    Sch. of Econ. & Manage., North China Electr. Power Univ., Beijing, China
  • fYear
    2010
  • fDate
    29-31 Oct. 2010
  • Firstpage
    116
  • Lastpage
    119
  • Abstract
    Green engineering is certain require of building resource conserving and environment friendly society, it is also the guarantee for sustainable development of construction industry. However, for saving investment and reducing project cost, construction units, as investors, are usually reluctant to implement green engineering. So it is necessary for government to take administrative means to supervise construction units. In this paper, three static game models for green engineering between the government and construction units are established based on hypotheses, and equilibrium strategies are deduced respectively. According to the equilibrium strategies, the government couldn´t promote construction units to take green engineering only with direct rewards. But if the government gives the public an incentive to supervise construction units, and strengthen the punishment dynamics, the green engineering can be promoted effectively.
  • Keywords
    construction industry; cost reduction; environmental factors; game theory; government policies; investment; sustainable development; building resource; construction industry; construction unit; environment friendly society; equilibrium strategy; government unit; green engineering; investment; project cost reduction; punishment dynamics; static game model; sustainable development; Government; Road transportation; game theory; government; green engineering; incentive;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management (IE&EM), 2010 IEEE 17Th International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Xiamen
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-6483-8
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/ICIEEM.2010.5646630
  • Filename
    5646630