Title :
Non-Cooperation in Competitive P2P Networks
Author :
Yang, Beverly ; Condie, Tyson ; Kamvar, Sepandar ; Garcia-Molina, Hector
Author_Institution :
Comput. Sci. Dept., Stanford Univ., CA
Abstract :
Large-scale competitive P2P networks are threatened by the non-cooperation problem, where peers do not forward queries to potential competitors. Non-cooperation will be a growing problem in such applications as pay-per-transaction file-sharing, P2P auctions, and P2P service discovery networks, where peers are in competition with each other to provide services. Here, the authors showed how non-cooperation causes unacceptable degradation in quality of results, and present an economic protocol to address this problem. This protocol, called the RTR protocol, is based on the buying and selling of the right-to-respond (RTR) to each query in the network. Through simulations it is shown how the RTR protocol not only overcomes non-cooperation by providing proper incentives to peers, but also results in a network that is even more effective and efficient through intelligent, incentive-compatible routing of messages
Keywords :
cooperative systems; peer-to-peer computing; query processing; routing protocols; P2P auctions; P2P networks; P2P service discovery networks; RTR protocol; competitive networks; economic protocol; noncooperation; pay per transaction file sharing; right to respond protocol; Application software; Computer science; Costs; Degradation; Information retrieval; Intelligent networks; Large-scale systems; Peer to peer computing; Routing protocols; Usability;
Conference_Titel :
Distributed Computing Systems, 2005. ICDCS 2005. Proceedings. 25th IEEE International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Columbus, OH
Print_ISBN :
0-7695-2331-5
DOI :
10.1109/ICDCS.2005.52