Title :
NoSEBrEaK - attacking honeynets
Author :
Dornseif, Maximillian ; Holz, Thorsten ; Klein, C.N.
Author_Institution :
Lab. for Dependable Distributed Syst., Rheinisch-Westfalische Tech. Hochschule, Aachen, Germany
Abstract :
It is usually assumed that honeynets are hard to detect and that attempts to detect or disable them can be unconditionally monitored. We scrutinize this assumption and demonstrate a method how a host in a honeynet can be completely controlled by an attacker without any substantial logging taking place.
Keywords :
security of data; system monitoring; data security; honeynets; system monitoring; Communication channels; Condition monitoring; Cryptography; Information security; Kernel; Laboratories; Linux; Protection; Telecommunication traffic; Turning;
Conference_Titel :
Information Assurance Workshop, 2004. Proceedings from the Fifth Annual IEEE SMC
Print_ISBN :
0-7803-8572-1
DOI :
10.1109/IAW.2004.1437807
