DocumentCode
3308163
Title
NoSEBrEaK - attacking honeynets
Author
Dornseif, Maximillian ; Holz, Thorsten ; Klein, C.N.
Author_Institution
Lab. for Dependable Distributed Syst., Rheinisch-Westfalische Tech. Hochschule, Aachen, Germany
fYear
2004
fDate
10-11 June 2004
Firstpage
123
Lastpage
129
Abstract
It is usually assumed that honeynets are hard to detect and that attempts to detect or disable them can be unconditionally monitored. We scrutinize this assumption and demonstrate a method how a host in a honeynet can be completely controlled by an attacker without any substantial logging taking place.
Keywords
security of data; system monitoring; data security; honeynets; system monitoring; Communication channels; Condition monitoring; Cryptography; Information security; Kernel; Laboratories; Linux; Protection; Telecommunication traffic; Turning;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Information Assurance Workshop, 2004. Proceedings from the Fifth Annual IEEE SMC
Print_ISBN
0-7803-8572-1
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/IAW.2004.1437807
Filename
1437807
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