Title :
Iterative incentive scheme for outsourced IA
Author :
Schmitz, Edward ; Pinto, C. Ariel ; Arora, Ashish ; Telang, Rahul
Abstract :
IT infrastructure can be outsourced to contractors, including the primary responsibility for maintaining network security. Even though an outsourcing contract specifies the minimum level of performance, there is a need to motivate a contractor to further improve such performance. This paper discusses the outsourcing of information assurance (IA) at the Navy Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) and proposes a model to motivate contractor to perform better using service level agreements (SLAs) and incentives as tools. The model uses an iterative process to overcome the problem of lack of information and serves as basis for data collection & metric development. Coincidentally, this situation exists in other assurance-related outsourcing endeavors such as homeland security.
Keywords :
contracts; incentive schemes; intranets; outsourcing; security of data; IT infrastructure; Navy Marine Corps Intranet; homeland security; information assurance outsourcing; iterative incentive scheme; outsourcing contract; service level agreement; Computer networks; Contracts; Cost function; Filtering; Government; Incentive schemes; Information security; Outsourcing; Terrorism; Virtual private networks;
Conference_Titel :
Information Assurance Workshop, 2004. Proceedings from the Fifth Annual IEEE SMC
Print_ISBN :
0-7803-8572-1
DOI :
10.1109/IAW.2004.1437853