DocumentCode
3329179
Title
A concrete security treatment of symmetric encryption
Author
Bellare, M. ; Desai, A. ; Jokipii, E. ; Rogaway, P.
Author_Institution
Dept. of Comput. Sci. & Eng., California Univ., San Diego, La Jolla, CA, USA
fYear
1997
fDate
20-22 Oct 1997
Firstpage
394
Lastpage
403
Abstract
We study notions and schemes for symmetric (ie. private key) encryption in a concrete security framework. We give four different notions of security against chosen plaintext attack and analyze the concrete complexity of reductions among them, providing both upper and lower bounds, and obtaining tight relations. In this way we classify notions (even though polynomially reducible to each other) as stronger or weaker in terms of concrete security. Next we provide concrete security analyses of methods to encrypt using a block cipher, including the most popular encryption method, CBC. We establish tight bounds (meaning matching upper bounds and attacks) on the success of adversaries as a function of their resources
Keywords
computational complexity; cryptography; attacks; block cipher; complexity; concrete security; matching upper bounds; plaintext attack; private key; symmetric encryption; tight bounds; Computer science; Concrete; Cryptography; Drives; Engineering profession; Marine vehicles; Polynomials; Security; Uniform resource locators; Upper bound;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Foundations of Computer Science, 1997. Proceedings., 38th Annual Symposium on
Conference_Location
Miami Beach, FL
ISSN
0272-5428
Print_ISBN
0-8186-8197-7
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/SFCS.1997.646128
Filename
646128
Link To Document