Revenue sharing contract in a cloud computing service supply chain with a monopoly AIP and multiple competing asps under asymmetric information

We design a cloud computing service supply chain with a monopoly application infrastructure provider (AIP) and multiple competing application service providers (ASPs) under asymmetric information. We use Bertrand competition to characterize the competitive relationship between ASPs. A service level agreement (SLA) serves as the foundation for the expected level of ASPs´ services. The service system of ASPs is modeled as an M/M/1 queueing system while the effects of congestion are considered. We study the problem how to coordinate the cloud computing service supply chain with revenue-sharing contract under asymmetric information ,and propose a new model relevantly. In our model ,the AIP as the leader has the decision-making right for wholesale price and revenue-sharing proportion ,while ASPs as the followers have just the right to conceal the information on marginal cost and determine the ordering computing capacity . We discuss the AIP´s optimal revenue sharing strategy in case ASPs conceal the unit application service cost ,with a comparative analysis made under symmetrical information at the same time. A numerical simulation is done and the computing results show that the AIP ´s optimal revenue-sharing strategy to spur ASP swill pay a price for the anonymity and unobservability of ASPs´ private information and reduce his/her profit ,while ASPs can gain from that.