Algebraic Side-Channel Attack on SMS4 Key Schedule

Author

Huiying, Liu ; Tao, Wang ; Xinjie, Zhao ; Kehui, Wu

Author_Institution

Dept. of Comput. Eng., Ordnance Eng. Coll., Shijiazhuang, China

fYear

2011

fDate

21-23 Oct. 2011

Firstpage

553

Lastpage

556

Abstract

Algebraic Side-channel attacks (ASCA) have been recently introduced as a powerful cryptanalysis technique against block cipher. These attacks represent both a target algorithm and its physical information leakages as an over-defined system of equations that the adversary tries to solve. In this paper, we apply ASCA to the SMS4 key schedule based on Hamming weight model. Experiments show that ASCA are still applicable in this context, 8 rounds of consecutive leakages can solve for the key with in 20 seconds and 24 rounds of randomly distributed leakages can solve for the key within 40 seconds.

Keywords

cryptography; scheduling; telecommunication channels; ASCA; Hamming weight model; SMS4 key schedule; algebraic side-channel attack; block cipher; cryptanalysis technique; equation overdefined system; physical information leakage; randomly distributed leakage; target algorithm; time 20 s; time 40 s; Boolean functions; Encryption; Equations; Hamming weight; Mathematical model; Schedules; Algebraic cryptoanalysis; Key Schedule; SAT solver; SMS4; Side-channel attacks;

fLanguage

English

Publisher

ieee

Conference_Titel

Instrumentation, Measurement, Computer, Communication and Control, 2011 First International Conference on

Conference_Location

Beijing

Print_ISBN

978-0-7695-4519-6

Type

conf

DOI

10.1109/IMCCC.2011.143

Filename

6154168