Title :
A Research of Game-Based Bidding Model for Green Electricity in Competitive Power Market
Author :
Zeng, Shao-lun ; Ren, Yu-long
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Manage. Sci., Sichuan Univ. of Sci. & Eng., Zigong
Abstract :
The voluntary purchase mechanism of green electricity and the trading mechanism of green certificate are restricted by the economic development level, customers´ environmental protection consciousness, etc. In this paper, the game-based competitive bidding model of green electricity and conventional power (coal-fired power) is constructed. The green electricity is inferior to the conventional power because of the restriction of cost and scale under the present bidding system without regard to the environmental cost. Suppose there´s financial subsidy or transfer payment for the green electricity from the government or the government increases the emission cost of conventional power, we extend the above bidding model. The result shows that the green electricity can bid in the competitive power market.
Keywords :
costing; environmental factors; game theory; government policies; power markets; power system economics; environmental cost; game-based bidding model; government policy; green electricity purchase mechanism; power market; Costs; Energy consumption; Energy management; Environmental economics; Government; Law; Power generation economics; Power markets; Power system protection; Renewable energy resources;
Conference_Titel :
Power and Energy Engineering Conference, 2009. APPEEC 2009. Asia-Pacific
Conference_Location :
Wuhan
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-2486-3
Electronic_ISBN :
978-1-4244-2487-0
DOI :
10.1109/APPEEC.2009.4918114