Title :
Analysis on collusive game between owner of art work and investor
Author :
Juanjuan Ding ; Xuefeng Zhang ; Yi Wang
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Econ. & Bus. Adm., North China Univ. of Tech, Beijing, China
Abstract :
The fraud auction under collusion between owner of art work and investor in the art market may lead to advertisement effect, and affect the emotional estimation and non-rational decision of investor. Consequently, it would do harm to the better development of art market. This article analyzed the root and the realizable condition of collusion between owner and investor. The results showed that the benefits of owner and interior investor in fraud auction would become identical; Strengthening the control of marginal utility of one player may have an effect on the other´s collusive activity, and leaded to decrease of fraud auction probability.
Keywords :
art; game theory; investment; art market; art work investor; art work owner; collusive game; fraud auction; marginal utility control; owner-investor collusion condition; Art; Economics; Educational institutions; Estimation; Games; Resource management; Quasi-Shapley value; collusion; fraud auction;
Conference_Titel :
Natural Computation (ICNC), 2011 Seventh International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Shanghai
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-9950-2
DOI :
10.1109/ICNC.2011.6022565