DocumentCode
3355132
Title
The choice between the law of penalization and superintendence of environmental protection from the view of game theory
Author
Liping, Liu ; Xianjun, Wang
Author_Institution
Social Sci. Dept, Harbin Univ. of Commerce, Harbin, China
fYear
2010
fDate
26-28 June 2010
Firstpage
5055
Lastpage
5058
Abstract
Focusing on the serious environmental pollution and current situation of environmental protection in china, the article demonstrates a view to solving the problem by building a game theory model. The main idea is that we should restrict the enterprise´s movement by way of a series of policy in order to reduce the environmental problem(pollution). At the same time, the model is proved theoretically that the view is better than the current law of penalization only. Finally, the article brings forward some countermeasures from different aspects such as mechanism, management mode, legal system, social resource, ability, evaluation, market and technology.
Keywords
environmental legislation; game theory; pollution; enterprise movement; environmental pollution; environmental protection; game theory; legal system; management mode; penalization law; social resource; superintendence; Business; Environmental economics; Environmentally friendly manufacturing techniques; Game theory; Law enforcement; Legal factors; Pollution; Protection; Resource management; Technology management; enterprise; game theory; law enforcers; model supervision;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Mechanic Automation and Control Engineering (MACE), 2010 International Conference on
Conference_Location
Wuhan
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-7737-1
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/MACE.2010.5535993
Filename
5535993
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