DocumentCode
3452509
Title
Intransitive non-interference for cryptographic purposes
Author
Backes, Michael ; Pfitzmann, Birgit
Author_Institution
IBM Zurich Res. Lab., Ruschlikon, Switzerland
fYear
2003
fDate
11-14 May 2003
Firstpage
140
Lastpage
152
Abstract
Information flow and non-interference have recently become very popular concepts for expressing both integrity and privacy properties. Because of the enormous potential of transmitting information using probabilistic methods of cryptography, interest arose in capturing probabilistic non-interference. We investigate the notion of intransitive probabilistic non-interference in reactive systems, i.e., downgrading of probabilistic information and detection of probabilistic information flow by one or more involved third parties. Based on concrete examples, we derive several definitions that comprise cryptography-related details like error probabilities and computational restrictions. This makes the definitions applicable to systems involving real cryptography. Detection of probabilistic information flow is significantly more complicated to define if several third parties are involved because of the possibilities of secret sharing. We solve this problem by graph-theoretic techniques.
Keywords
cryptography; data integrity; data privacy; error statistics; graph theory; real-time systems; computational restrictions; cryptography; error probabilities; graph-theoretic techniques; information flow; integrity; intransitive noninterference; privacy; probabilistic noninterference; reactive systems; secret sharing; Computational modeling; Concrete; Cryptography; Error probability; Information filters; Information security; Laboratories; Polynomials; Privacy;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Security and Privacy, 2003. Proceedings. 2003 Symposium on
ISSN
1081-6011
Print_ISBN
0-7695-1940-7
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/SECPRI.2003.1199333
Filename
1199333
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