• DocumentCode
    3460168
  • Title

    Cooperative game theory for sharing transmission charges in electricity markets

  • Author

    Balagopalan, S. ; Anooja, V.S.

  • Author_Institution
    Vidya Acad. of Sci. & Technol., Thrissur, India
  • fYear
    2011
  • fDate
    22-24 Nov. 2011
  • Firstpage
    1
  • Lastpage
    6
  • Abstract
    Retractions in real time operation of transmission sector of electricity markets is the concern addressed here. This issue is resolved through the design of a socially stable pay-off vector in a Socially Structured Transferable Utility game based on cooperative game theory. Its algorithm requires an ordering of the players, here Discos, in a given social structure and a method of ranking them in a permutation and is devised to be endogenous to power markets. A transmission price is crafted to be used as the coalition value of the game, in order to identify trades with least impact on the grid. The development of power vectors signifying the strength of the players, ranking based on objective of the game and price design are in tune with the needs of an electricity market and a socially stable solution space. The game is applied to a five bus power system and results are analyzed. This work is important in the context of a still embryonic electricity market requiring a reliable, secure and harmonious transmission sector.
  • Keywords
    game theory; power grids; power markets; power transmission economics; power transmission reliability; real-time systems; cooperative game theory; electricity markets; five bus power system; harmonious transmission sector; permutation; power grid; power markets; real time operation; reliable transmission sector; secure transmission sector; sharing transmission charges; socially stable pay-off vector; socially structured transferable utility game; transmission price;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    iet
  • Conference_Titel
    Reliability of Transmission and Distribution Networks (RTDN 2011), IET Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    London
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1049/cp.2011.0536
  • Filename
    6162279