Title :
Economical Incentive Contract Design with Asymmetric Information in Building Energy Efficiency Retrofit
Author :
Qingmiao Han ; Songlin Zhan ; Yang Zhang ; Jian Chen
Author_Institution :
Harbin Inst. of Technol., Harbin
Abstract :
Existing Building energy efficiency retrofit is an important component of Chinese building energy efficiency strategy. There are several factors determining the level of inputs and the effect are asymmetric information within the energy efficiency regeneration process, such as endeavor of the owners of existing buildings, etc. Using the principle-agent theory to establish a cooperative game model of the Government and the owners of existing buildings, and then educe bilateral strategies of this cooperative game. Under the assumption of risk-neutral agent, analyze the risk contracting, incentive costs and agent cost ulterior. The conclusion is that the level of efforts made by existing buildings owners plays a key role to the process of energy efficiency retrofit.
Keywords :
building management systems; contracts; costing; energy conservation; energy management systems; game theory; maintenance engineering; Chinese building energy efficiency; Government; asymmetric information; bilateral strategies; building energy efficiency retrofit; cooperative game model; economical incentive contract design; energy efficiency regeneration process; principle-agent theory; risk-neutral agent; Buildings; Civil engineering; Contracts; Costs; Energy efficiency; Game theory; Government; Heating; Investments; Power generation economics;
Conference_Titel :
Wireless Communications, Networking and Mobile Computing, 2008. WiCOM '08. 4th International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Dalian
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-2107-7
Electronic_ISBN :
978-1-4244-2108-4
DOI :
10.1109/WiCom.2008.2039