Title :
A Nash Bargaining Solution to Trade Credit Term Determination
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Econ. & Manage., Beijing Univ. of Aeronaut. & Astronaut., Beijing
Abstract :
Credit term is taken as an instrument participating coordination surplus generated by credit extending by the supplier. We model trade credit determination as a Nash bargaining problem between supplier and retailer. Sensitivity analysis of a numerical example shows relativity of supplier´s financing cost to the retailer´s is the key determinate of credit term offered by the supplier. This result directly supports financing motive theory of trade credit.
Keywords :
costing; credit transactions; retailing; supply chain management; Nash bargaining; coordination surplus; credit term; financing cost; financing motive theory; retailing; sensitivity analysis; supply chain; trade credit; Costs; Delay; Forward contracts; Instruments; Marketing and sales; Partial response channels; Portfolios; Sensitivity analysis; Supply chains;
Conference_Titel :
Wireless Communications, Networking and Mobile Computing, 2008. WiCOM '08. 4th International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Dalian
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-2107-7
Electronic_ISBN :
978-1-4244-2108-4
DOI :
10.1109/WiCom.2008.2378