Study on incentive interruptible load contract with risk preference of power companies

Author

Qi, Quan ; Li, Xue ; Li, Yuzeng

Author_Institution

Dept. of Autom., Shanghai Univ., Shanghai

fYear

2008

fDate

6-9 April 2008

Firstpage

587

Lastpage

591

Abstract

Interruptible load contract is an effective tool to evade the risk of market price of power companies in electricity market. Based on the mechanism design theory, this paper develops an incentive interruptible load contract model for discrete customer types, which takes risk preference of power companies into account. The proposed model will lead customers to voluntarily reveal their true customer types, and choose the right contracts. A numerical example is presented to verify the effectiveness of the proposed model.

Keywords

contracts; incentive schemes; power markets; electricity market; incentive interruptible load contract; market price; power companies; risk preference; Bridges; Contracts; Costs; Electricity supply industry; Electricity supply industry deregulation; Fluctuations; Load modeling; Power generation; Power systems; Supervisory control; Certain equivalent; electricity market; interruptible load; mechanism design; risk preference;

fLanguage

English

Publisher

ieee

Conference_Titel

Electric Utility Deregulation and Restructuring and Power Technologies, 2008. DRPT 2008. Third International Conference on

Conference_Location

Nanjuing

Print_ISBN

978-7-900714-13-8

Electronic_ISBN

978-7-900714-13-8

Type

conf

DOI

10.1109/DRPT.2008.4523474

Filename

4523474