Title :
Risk evasion contract design for distribution utility based on incentives theory
Author :
Dengwei Duan ; Liu, Junyong ; Wu, Jiguang
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Electr. Eng., Sichuan Univ., Chengdu, China
Abstract :
Distribution utilities are facing enormous risks in market environment. The causes of risks are analyzed and a risk-evasion contract design method is presented based on incentives theory and load management techniques. The contract design is to help the utility evade risks by encouraging customers´ to actively apply load management behaviors. Principal-agent model is employed in risk-evasion incentive contract design. The utility´s optimal contracts are developed with considering risk-averse and risk-taker customers respectively, the correlation of market price and retail price is also considered in contract design. The simulation results show the feasibility of proposed methods in evasion risks of spot market.
Keywords :
incentive schemes; load management; power markets; power system simulation; pricing; risk analysis; distribution utility; electricity markets; incentives theory; load management techniques; market price; principal-agent model; retail price; risk analysis; risk evasion contract design; risk-averse customers; risk-taker customers; utility optimal contracts; utility regulation; Contracts; Design methodology; Elasticity; Electricity supply industry; Electricity supply industry deregulation; Energy consumption; Load management; Power generation; Power industry; Risk analysis;
Conference_Titel :
Electric Utility Deregulation, Restructuring and Power Technologies, 2004. (DRPT 2004). Proceedings of the 2004 IEEE International Conference on
Print_ISBN :
0-7803-8237-4
DOI :
10.1109/DRPT.2004.1338075
