DocumentCode :
3495221
Title :
FASE: An Open Run-Time Reconfigurable FPGA Architecture for Tamper-Resistant and Secure Embedded Systems
Author :
Chaudhuri, Sumanta ; Danger, Jean-Luc ; Guilley, Sylvain ; Hoogvorst, Philippe
Author_Institution :
LTCI, CNRS, Paris
fYear :
2006
fDate :
Sept. 2006
Firstpage :
1
Lastpage :
9
Abstract :
The run-time reconfigurable (RTR) feature is highly desirable for flexible and fast self-contained systems. RTR can be achieved on some commercial FPGA platforms. We propose an open solution, called FASE that allows for fine-grain RTR, designed to be more intuitive than currently available solutions. The issues of initializing RTR soft IP-cores and a design flow to manage the dynamics of RTR are presented. In the context of secure embedded systems, there is a need for both flexibility and tamper-resistance. However, the robustness level for security constraints is difficult to get and to prove because of the proprietary hidden structures. The FASE architecture addresses these issues. It makes it possible for any designer to implement custom and arbitrary dynamic strategies. We illustrate two case studies: an implementation-level counter-measure against side-channel attacks and an efficient strategy to thwart fault injection attacks against cryptographic functions
Keywords :
embedded systems; field programmable gate arrays; reconfigurable architectures; security of data; FASE architecture; cryptographic function; run-time reconfigurable FPGA architecture; secure embedded system; side-channel attack; tamper-resistance; thwart fault injection attack; Circuit faults; Cryptography; Embedded system; Field programmable gate arrays; Hardware; Reconfigurable logic; Robustness; Routing; Runtime; Security;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Reconfigurable Computing and FPGA's, 2006. ReConFig 2006. IEEE International Conference on
Conference_Location :
San Luis Potosi
Print_ISBN :
1-4244-0690-0
Electronic_ISBN :
1-4244-0690-0
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/RECONF.2006.307752
Filename :
4099972
Link To Document :
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