DocumentCode
3505062
Title
On unconditionally secure multi-party sampling from scratch1
Author
Wang, Ye ; Ishwar, Prakash
Author_Institution
Boston Univ., Boston, MA, USA
fYear
2011
fDate
July 31 2011-Aug. 5 2011
Firstpage
1782
Lastpage
1786
Abstract
In the problem of secure multi-party sampling, n parties wish to securely sample an n-variate joint distribution, with each party receiving a sample of one of the correlated variables. The objective is to correctly produce the samples using a distributed message passing protocol, while maintaining privacy against a coalition of passively cheating parties. In the two-party case, we fully characterize the joint distributions that can be securely sampled under perfect correctness and privacy requirements as well as under weakened correctness and privacy requirements. Furthermore, we show that the distributions that can be securely sampled can be produced with a protocol that only uses one round of unidirectional communication. For the n-party case, any distribution can be securely sampled with privacy against a strict minority coalition, due to well-known results in secure multi-party computation. However, when privacy against a majority coalition is required, not all distributions can be securely sampled. We give necessary conditions and sufficient conditions for distributions that can be securely sampled. However, the exact characterization of the distributions that can be securely sampled remains open.
Keywords
data privacy; message passing; protocols; security of data; distributed message passing protocol; majority coalition; multiparty sampling security; n-variate joint distribution; privacy requirement; strict minority coalition; unidirectional communication; Joints; Mutual information; Privacy; Protocols; Random variables; Security; common information; secure multi-party computation; secure sampling; unconditional security;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Information Theory Proceedings (ISIT), 2011 IEEE International Symposium on
Conference_Location
St. Petersburg
ISSN
2157-8095
Print_ISBN
978-1-4577-0596-0
Electronic_ISBN
2157-8095
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ISIT.2011.6033855
Filename
6033855
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