• DocumentCode
    3511955
  • Title

    On Security Model of One-Round Authenticated Key Exchange

  • Author

    Haibo Tian

  • Author_Institution
    Sch. of Inf. Sci. & Technol., Sun Yat-Sun Univ., Guangzhou, China
  • fYear
    2013
  • fDate
    9-11 Sept. 2013
  • Firstpage
    319
  • Lastpage
    322
  • Abstract
    Considering one-round AKE, Cremers and Feltz at ESORICS 2012 defined a security model with perfect forward secrecy (PFS). However, in that model Boyd and and Nieto´s general attack about PFS is unworkable. This paper extends their model to capture the general attack and shows that a compiled one-round AKE protocol does not achieve the PFS in the extended model. It suggests to withstand the general attack by extra assumptions.
  • Keywords
    cryptographic protocols; Boyd general attack; Nieto general attack; PFS; one-round AKE protocol; one-round authenticated key exchange; perfect forward secrecy; security model; Educational institutions; Games; Hardware; Protocols; Public key; forward secrecy; models; one-round AKE;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Intelligent Networking and Collaborative Systems (INCoS), 2013 5th International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Xi´an
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/INCoS.2013.59
  • Filename
    6630430
    • Link To Document
    https://search.isc.ac/dl/search/defaultta.aspx?DTC=49&DC=3511955