• DocumentCode
    3513821
  • Title

    Market Power in Power Markets: Game Theory vs. Agent-Based Approach

  • Author

    Saguan, Marcelo ; Keseric, Nenad ; Dessante, Philippe ; Glachant, Jean-Michel

  • Author_Institution
    Supelec
  • fYear
    2006
  • fDate
    15-18 Aug. 2006
  • Firstpage
    1
  • Lastpage
    6
  • Abstract
    Game theory and agent-based economics approaches have been used to study imperfect competition in electricity markets. In this paper these two approaches are firstly described and compared using a simple text book example. Simulations show that the two approaches converge to the same outcome when unique Nash equilibrium exists and assumptions in the game theory approach are realistic. Finally, a 3 Latin American countries\´ power market ("Mercado Electrico Andino") is studied. A simple benefits analysis of new interconnection capacity for this regional market shows the importance of proper assumptions and the complementarities of both approaches
  • Keywords
    game theory; power markets; power system economics; power system interconnection; Latin American countries; Nash equilibrium; agent-based approach; agent-based economics; game theory; interconnection capacity; market power; power markets; Analytical models; Books; Electricity supply industry; Game theory; Helium; Nash equilibrium; Power generation economics; Power markets; Production; South America; agent-based economics; electricity prices; game theory; market design; market power; transmission;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Transmission & Distribution Conference and Exposition: Latin America, 2006. TDC '06. IEEE/PES
  • Conference_Location
    Caracas
  • Print_ISBN
    1-4244-0287-5
  • Electronic_ISBN
    1-4244-0288-3
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/TDCLA.2006.311439
  • Filename
    4104670