DocumentCode
3513821
Title
Market Power in Power Markets: Game Theory vs. Agent-Based Approach
Author
Saguan, Marcelo ; Keseric, Nenad ; Dessante, Philippe ; Glachant, Jean-Michel
Author_Institution
Supelec
fYear
2006
fDate
15-18 Aug. 2006
Firstpage
1
Lastpage
6
Abstract
Game theory and agent-based economics approaches have been used to study imperfect competition in electricity markets. In this paper these two approaches are firstly described and compared using a simple text book example. Simulations show that the two approaches converge to the same outcome when unique Nash equilibrium exists and assumptions in the game theory approach are realistic. Finally, a 3 Latin American countries\´ power market ("Mercado Electrico Andino") is studied. A simple benefits analysis of new interconnection capacity for this regional market shows the importance of proper assumptions and the complementarities of both approaches
Keywords
game theory; power markets; power system economics; power system interconnection; Latin American countries; Nash equilibrium; agent-based approach; agent-based economics; game theory; interconnection capacity; market power; power markets; Analytical models; Books; Electricity supply industry; Game theory; Helium; Nash equilibrium; Power generation economics; Power markets; Production; South America; agent-based economics; electricity prices; game theory; market design; market power; transmission;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Transmission & Distribution Conference and Exposition: Latin America, 2006. TDC '06. IEEE/PES
Conference_Location
Caracas
Print_ISBN
1-4244-0287-5
Electronic_ISBN
1-4244-0288-3
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/TDCLA.2006.311439
Filename
4104670
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