The Value of Information Sharing in Supply Chain with Bertrand Competition Retailers

Author

Shao-hui, Dong ; Xi Bao ; Li-na, Tian ; Xin, Miao

Author_Institution

Sch. of Manage., Harbin Inst. of Technol.

fYear

2006

fDate

5-7 Oct. 2006

Firstpage

663

Lastpage

667

Abstract

In the context of a two-echelon supply chain with one manufacturer and many retailers which are engaged in a Bertrand competition and have some private information of demand, the information sharing has been investigated by using game-theoretical concepts. The analysis suggested that the information sharing can increase the profit of the whole supply chain and the manufacturer but it also decreases the retailers´ profit. This makes the retailers have no incentives to share their demand information to the manufacturer. So, no information sharing is the unique equilibrium in this game

Keywords

game theory; profitability; supply chain management; Bertrand competition retailer profit; game-theoretical concepts; information sharing; two-echelon supply chain; Counting circuits; Decision making; Educational institutions; Game theory; Information analysis; Production; Supply chain management; Supply chains; Technology management; Virtual manufacturing; Bertrand competition; Equilibrium; Information sharing; Supply chain;

fLanguage

English

Publisher

ieee

Conference_Titel

Management Science and Engineering, 2006. ICMSE '06. 2006 International Conference on

Conference_Location

Lille

Print_ISBN

7-5603-2355-3

Type

conf

DOI

10.1109/ICMSE.2006.313942

Filename

4104981