Title :
The Value of Information Sharing in Supply Chain with Bertrand Competition Retailers
Author :
Shao-hui, Dong ; Xi Bao ; Li-na, Tian ; Xin, Miao
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Manage., Harbin Inst. of Technol.
Abstract :
In the context of a two-echelon supply chain with one manufacturer and many retailers which are engaged in a Bertrand competition and have some private information of demand, the information sharing has been investigated by using game-theoretical concepts. The analysis suggested that the information sharing can increase the profit of the whole supply chain and the manufacturer but it also decreases the retailers´ profit. This makes the retailers have no incentives to share their demand information to the manufacturer. So, no information sharing is the unique equilibrium in this game
Keywords :
game theory; profitability; supply chain management; Bertrand competition retailer profit; game-theoretical concepts; information sharing; two-echelon supply chain; Counting circuits; Decision making; Educational institutions; Game theory; Information analysis; Production; Supply chain management; Supply chains; Technology management; Virtual manufacturing; Bertrand competition; Equilibrium; Information sharing; Supply chain;
Conference_Titel :
Management Science and Engineering, 2006. ICMSE '06. 2006 International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Lille
Print_ISBN :
7-5603-2355-3
DOI :
10.1109/ICMSE.2006.313942
