• DocumentCode
    3517959
  • Title

    An Analysis on Factors Affecting the Negotiated Power of the Enterprise Ownership

  • Author

    Cheng Cheng-ping ; Xu Gui-fang ; Chen Fang-hong

  • Author_Institution
    Sch. of Econ. & Manage., Wuhan Univ.
  • fYear
    2006
  • fDate
    5-7 Oct. 2006
  • Firstpage
    820
  • Lastpage
    826
  • Abstract
    The enterprise is the nexus of contracts of all factors owners. On condition that the institution and culture background are certain, the structure of the enterprise ownership is the Nash equilibrium of all factors owners´ dynamic game. During the game process, facing to the different technical condition and market environment, the negotiated power of each factor´s owner is a integrated result of the six following factors: the relative contribution to the enterprise output, the finance hostage ability of undertaking the enterprise operational risk, the asset scarcity or substitutability, the supervision of the asset operation, the asset specificity and the worried degree of the negotiation break. But most discussions were isolated analyses of just one or two affected factors, so it was inevitable to get an unscientific or partial result. In this paper, we think that the arrangement of the enterprise ownership is an interactional result by different factors. In the different inner and outer environment, the structure of the enterprise ownership will have different forms. The enterprise is a fuse furnace of resource for the team production, which also can be recognized as the collective property of all resource owners. How to make the collective property produce the biggest profit needs our analyses to its attributes and makes the participator with the compared advantage to have it. Then, we have to make the exclusive rules specially in order to avoid such situations that the responsibility of each parts don´t clear or the tortious conducts happen, that is the essential of the arrangement of the enterprise ownership. Y. Barzel once said that each goods can be recognized as the nexus of attributes and different goods contain different kinds of attributes. All attributes were in the control of one person may not the most efficient. So, people sometimes give the ownership of different attributes of one goods to different individual. After dividing, people need to make- the exclusive rules specially, in order to avoid the tortious conducts among the owners happening. Although Y. Barzel talked about the goods, it is also suitable to the enterprise. The dividing of the enterprise ownership is not a transcendental rule, but a dynamic game result among each resource owners. It is necessary for us to point out that the game result of the enterprise ownership also affected by the diversity of technique, institution, cultural background, market environment and the differences of each resources and the owners´ character
  • Keywords
    contracts; marketing; organisational aspects; Nash equilibrium; asset scarcity; contracts; dynamic game process; enterprise operational risk; enterprise ownership; finance hostage ability; market environment; resource owners; team production; Contracts; Cultural differences; Energy management; Finance; Furnaces; Fuses; Humans; Nash equilibrium; Production; Affecting factors; Negotiated power; The enterprise ownership;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Management Science and Engineering, 2006. ICMSE '06. 2006 International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Lille
  • Print_ISBN
    7-5603-2355-3
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/ICMSE.2006.313960
  • Filename
    4105008