• DocumentCode
    3526714
  • Title

    Revisiting evolutionary game theory

  • Author

    Brunetti, Ilaria ; Altman, Eitan

  • Author_Institution
    Maestro team of INRIA, Sophia Antipolis, France
  • fYear
    2013
  • fDate
    10-13 Dec. 2013
  • Firstpage
    1842
  • Lastpage
    1847
  • Abstract
    Evolutionary game theory is a relatively young mathematical theory that aims to formalize in mathematical terms evolution models in biology. In recent years this paradigm has penetrated more and more into other areas such as the linguistics, economics and engineering. The current theory of evolutionary game makes an implicit assumption that the evolution is driven by selfishness of individuals who interact with each others. In mathematical terms this can be stated as “an individual equals a player in a game model”. This assumption turns out to be quite restrictive in modeling evolution in biology. It is now more and more accepted among biologist that the evolution is driven by the selfish interests of large groups of individuals; a group may correspond for example to a whole beehive or to an ants´ nest. In this paper we propose an alternative paradigm for modeling evolution where a player does not necessarily represent an interacting individual but a whole class of such individuals.
  • Keywords
    evolutionary computation; game theory; biology; evolutionary game theory; mathematical term evolution models; mathematical theory; Biological system modeling; Games; Nash equilibrium; Sociology; Standards; Statistics;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Decision and Control (CDC), 2013 IEEE 52nd Annual Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Firenze
  • ISSN
    0743-1546
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4673-5714-2
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/CDC.2013.6760150
  • Filename
    6760150