Value disruption information management in a supply chain with myopic customers

Author

Zhou, Wei-Gang ; Feng, Qian-Qian

Author_Institution

Sch. of Math. & Comput. Sci., Xiangfan Univ., Xiangfan, China

Volume

Part 3

fYear

2011

fDate

3-5 Sept. 2011

Firstpage

1612

Lastpage

1616

Abstract

This paper studies a supply chain, in which a supplier wholesales an item to a seller, and the seller competes with a rival for myopic customers. Customers´ value of the seller´s product can be disrupted with a certain probability. A hybrid game is used to study this supply chain. Under some conditions, we show that the supplier´s value of the disruption information increases with respect to the variance of the disruption, and the supplier´s value of the disruption scale information increases with respect to the disruption probability and the variance of the disruption scale.

Keywords

customer services; game theory; information management; probability; supply chain management; customer value; disruption probability; disruption scale information; hybrid game; myopic customers; seller product; supply chain management; value disruption information management; wholesales supplier; Contracts; Games; Nash equilibrium; Pricing; Random variables; Supply chains; Supply chain management; asymmetric information; hybrid game; myopic customer behavior; value disruption;

fLanguage

English

Publisher

ieee

Conference_Titel

Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management (IE&EM), 2011 IEEE 18Th International Conference on

Conference_Location

Changchun

Print_ISBN

978-1-61284-446-6

Type

conf

DOI

10.1109/ICIEEM.2011.6035468

Filename

6035468