Game theoretic approach to the stabilization of heterogeneous multiagent systems using subsidy

We consider a multiagent system consisting of selfish and heterogeneous agents. Its behavior is modeled by multipopulation replicator dynamics, where payoff functions of populations are different from each other. In general, there exist several equilibrium points in the replicator dynamics. In order to stabilize a desirable equilibrium point, we introduce a controller called a “government” which controls the behaviors of agents by offering them subsidies. In previous work, it is assumed that the government determines the subsidies based on the populations the agents belong to. In general, however, the government cannot identify the members of each population. In this paper, we assume that the government observes the action of each agent and determines the subsidies based on the observed action profile. Then, we model the controlled behaviors of the agents using replicator dynamics with feedback. We derive a stabilization condition of the target equilibrium point in the replicator dynamics.