Title :
Pricing design for robustness in linear quadratic games
Author :
Calderone, Daniel J. ; Ratliff, Lillian J. ; Sastry, S. Shankar
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Electr. Eng. & Comput. Sci., Univ. of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA
Abstract :
We show that designing prices to induce a socially optimal Nash equilibrium that is robust to small parameter perturbations in a linear-quadratic game can be framed as a convex program. In addition, we use a similar analysis to develop convex conditions that guarantee that the induced equilibrium is stable with respect to small deviations in players´ feedback strategies.
Keywords :
convex programming; game theory; pricing; convex conditions; convex program; linear quadratic games; optimal Nash equilibrium; parameter perturbations; player feedback strategies; pricing design; robustness; Equations; Lead; Pricing; Robustness;
Conference_Titel :
Decision and Control (CDC), 2013 IEEE 52nd Annual Conference on
Conference_Location :
Firenze
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4673-5714-2
DOI :
10.1109/CDC.2013.6760558
