• DocumentCode
    3543483
  • Title

    Markovian Modeling and Security Measure Analysis for Networks under Flooding DoS Attacks

  • Author

    Baumann, Hendrik ; Sandmann, Werner

  • Author_Institution
    Dept. of Appl. Stochastics & Oper. Res., Clausthal Univ. of Technol., Clausthal-Zellerfeld, Germany
  • fYear
    2012
  • fDate
    15-17 Feb. 2012
  • Firstpage
    298
  • Lastpage
    302
  • Abstract
    Network flooding is among the most prevalent modes of denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. It can seriously degrade the network operation to the point of being unable to serve any legitimate user as intended, because all resources are occupied with serving malicious attack requests. We model flooding DoS attacks by a three-dimensional continuous-time Markov chain (CTMC) that accounts for the environment in which the network under attack operates and incorporates a random dropping policy as a potential defense mechanism. The state space is structured such that the generator matrix is block tridiagonal and the CTMC becomes numerically tractable by matrix analytic methods. This enables us to compute security measures accurately and efficiently. Numerical results for varying parameter settings are provided in order to study flooding DoS attacks.
  • Keywords
    Markov processes; computer network security; matrix algebra; random processes; 3D continuous-time Markov chain; Markovian modeling; block tridiagonal generator matrix; defense mechanism; denial-of-service attacks; flooding DoS attacks; malicious attack request; matrix analytic method; network flooding; network operation; network under attack; random dropping policy; security measure analysis; state space structure; Analytical models; Computational modeling; Computer crime; Loss measurement; Markov processes; Solid modeling;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Parallel, Distributed and Network-Based Processing (PDP), 2012 20th Euromicro International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Garching
  • ISSN
    1066-6192
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4673-0226-5
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/PDP.2012.29
  • Filename
    6169564