Detecting stealth software with Strider GhostBuster

Stealth malware programs that silently infect enterprise and consumer machines are becoming a major threat to the future of the Internet. Resource hiding is a powerful stealth technique commonly used by malware to evade detection by computer users and anti-malware scanners. In this paper, we focus on a subclass of malware, termed "ghostware", which hide files, configuration settings, processes, and loaded modules from the operating system\´s query and enumeration application programming interfaces (APIs). Instead of targeting individual stealth implementations, we describe a systematic framework for detecting multiple types of hidden resources by leveraging the hiding behavior as a detection mechanism. Specifically, we adopt a cross-view diff-based approach to ghostware detection by comparing a high-level infected scan with a low-level clean scan and alternatively comparing an inside-the-box infected scan with an outside-the-box clean scan. We describe the design and implementation of the Strider GhostBuster tool and demonstrate its efficiency and effectiveness in detecting resources hidden by real-world malware such as rootkits, Trojans, and key-loggers.