Notice of RetractionSupply chain coordination by revenue sharing and effort contracts

Notice of Retraction

After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.

We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.

The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.

Under a revenue-sharing contract, the paper probes the main factors that affect the performance of supply chain, analyzes how to maintain the stability of the supply chain system. Considering a supply chain with a manufacturer and a distributor, based on game model, revenue sharing, contribute coefficient, innovation cost are discussed. The results indicate that the optimum effort varies directly with sharing coefficient and contribution coefficient, while varies inversely with the cost of innovate activity. The results also suggest the optimum sharing coefficient is relevant to contribute coefficient, innovation cost, but not significant to effort level. Comparing with Nash Equilibrium and Pareto Equilibrium, the article demonstrates that total revenue of supply chain in cooperative action strategy is less than non-cooperative. Besides, the effort level is also improved in cooperation strategy. For each member in supply chain, the member should determine their efforts, contribution and profit sharing proportion, and meanwhile they need to improve their core competitiveness. In addition, the members always asked for the purpose of collective overall profit.