User-centric analysis on jamming game with action detection error

We formulate the interactions between a legitimate transmitter and a smart jammer allocating power flexibly as a power control Stackelberg anti-jamming game with the action detection error from transmitter to jammer in a user-centric view. More specifically, decision-making of the players follows the subjective deviations specified by prospect theory instead of the traditional objective assumption controlled by expected utility theory. The Stackelberg equilibrium of the game as well as the Nash equilibrium are analyzed and the impact of the players´ subjectivity and action detection error on the signalto- interference and noise ratio at the receiver is measured. Simulation results show that a subjective jammer which is less likely to attack the transmitter results in the increasing of the the signal-to-interference plus noise ratio and the behaviors of the smart jammer in the Stackelberg game cause more damage to the legal communications.