Title :
DDoS Defense Mechanism Analysis Based on Signaling Game Model
Author :
Xiang Gao ; Yue-Fei Zhu
Author_Institution :
State Key Lab. of Math. Eng. & Adv. Comput., Zhengzhou, China
Abstract :
DDoS attack and defense is regarded as a multistage signaling game with observable actions. Its extensive form is given out, and its perfect bayesian nash equilibrium is solved. The current problems encountered by DDoS attack defense are discussed. Theoretical analysis proves the feasibility and effectiveness of the service hopping strategy. This paper draws a conclusion that adding service hopping strategy is superior to a pure filtering strategy, also provides beneficial reference on DDoS attack prevention.
Keywords :
Bayes methods; computer network security; game theory; DDoS attack and defense; DDoS attack prevention; DDoS defense mechanism analysis; beneficial reference; filtering strategy; multistage signaling game; observable actions; perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium; service hopping strategy; signaling game model; theoretical analysis; Bayes methods; Computer crime; Filtering; Games; Nash equilibrium; Receivers; Servers; denial of service; incomplete information; signaling game;
Conference_Titel :
Intelligent Human-Machine Systems and Cybernetics (IHMSC), 2013 5th International Conference on
Print_ISBN :
978-0-7695-5011-4
DOI :
10.1109/IHMSC.2013.105
