Quadratic program solution of communication links under jamming

In this paper we use a game theoretic approach to model a packetized wireless communication link under jamming. In contrast to the widely used zero-sum framework, we use the bimatrix framework. In bimatrix games each player has his own utility function, this in contrary to the zero-sum games where the sum of players payoffs is always zero. Hence, a much larger class of jamming problems, and many other applications, can be modeled using this framework. Furthermore, in many practical situations, players´ strategies must satisfy some additional constraints. To consider these situations, in our model we restrict players´ strategies to hyper-polyhedrons defined by linear inequalities. We prove that the Nash equilibrium solution of this constrained game corresponds to the global maximum of a quadratic program. Finally, we study jamming of a packetized wireless link and show that the game theoretic analysis of this typical jamming problem yields rather surprising results.