• DocumentCode
    3637028
  • Title

    Protecting TOR exit nodes from abuse

  • Author

    Stjepan Groš;Marko Salkić;Ivan Šipka

  • Author_Institution
    Faculty of Electrical and Computing Engineering, University of Zagreb, Unska bb, 10000, Croatia
  • fYear
    2010
  • Firstpage
    1246
  • Lastpage
    1249
  • Abstract
    TOR is a mechanism and a network that allows anonymous use of the resources on the Internet. This is very useful for countries with restricted human rights, but also in all the cases when someone has concerns about being watched or otherwise tracked. The main building blocks of the TOR network are TOR nodes that relay traffic in such way that each node knows for previous and next nodes. The special case are exit nodes that finally deliver traffic to it´s intended destination, but that don´t know from whom the traffic originates. All the TOR nodes are run by voluntaries throughout the Internet. It turns out that TOR network is heavily misused and thus it is dangerous to run TOR exit nodes as all the misuse of the network appears to be done from the exit nodes which could bring trouble to their owners. In this paper we analyse misuse of the TOR exit nodes and also propose mechanisms that could minimize, or even eliminate, misuse. More specifically, we analyse use of the Honeywall to protect TOR exit node.
  • Keywords
    "Protection","Peer to peer computing","Telecommunication traffic","Internet","Humans","Relays","Routing","Law","Protocols","Cryptography"
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    MIPRO, 2010 Proceedings of the 33rd International Convention
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-7763-0
  • Type

    conf

  • Filename
    5533659