DocumentCode
3660361
Title
Contracts of reverse logistics with different risk preferences
Author
Qiaolun Gu;Tiegang Gao
Author_Institution
School of Economics and Management, Tianjin University of Technology and Education, China
fYear
2015
Firstpage
2104
Lastpage
2109
Abstract
The reverse supply chain in our study consists of the disassembly centre and the collector. In this paper, we study the contract of the reverse supply chain with risk-neutral collector and risk-averse disassembly centre. Furthermore, we compare the contract with other two contracts given by our previous research: contract of risk-neutral collector and risk-neutral disassembly centre, and contract of risk-averse collector and risk-neutral disassembly centre. At the end, we analyze the optimal results by a numerical example. From the analysis, we find: if the disassembly centre is risk averse and the collector is risk neutral, the collector must share a large part of the penalty. This will result in a smaller optimal quantity of the used-products and lower profit of the collector and the disassembly centre.
Keywords
"Supply chains","Contracts","Tin","Investment","Electronic waste","Reverse logistics","Profitability"
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Information and Automation, 2015 IEEE International Conference on
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICInfA.2015.7279635
Filename
7279635
Link To Document