DocumentCode :
3710122
Title :
On the Cryptographic Hardness of Finding a Nash Equilibrium
Author :
Nir Bitansky;Omer Paneth;Alon Rosen
Author_Institution :
CSAIL, MIT, Cambridge, MA, USA
fYear :
2015
Firstpage :
1480
Lastpage :
1498
Abstract :
We prove that finding a Nash equilibrium of a game is hard, assuming the existence of indistinguishability obfuscation and one-way functions with sub-exponential hardness. We do so by showing how these cryptographic primitives give rise to a hard computational problem that lies in the complexity class PPAD, for which finding Nash equilibrium is complete. Previous proposals for basing PPAD-hardness on program obfuscation considered a strong "virtual black-box" notion that is subject to severe limitations and is unlikely to be realizable for the programs in question. In contrast, for indistinguishability obfuscation no such limitations are known, and recently, several candidate constructions of indistinguishability obfuscation were suggested based on different hardness assumptions on multilinear maps. Our result provides further evidence of the intractability of finding a Nash equilibrium, one that is extrinsic to the evidence presented so far.
Keywords :
"Cryptography","Nash equilibrium","Computer science","Games","Complexity theory","Search problems"
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), 2015 IEEE 56th Annual Symposium on
ISSN :
0272-5428
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/FOCS.2015.94
Filename :
7354468
Link To Document :
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