On modeling of adversary behavior and defense for survivability of military MANET applications

In this paper we develop a methodology and report preliminary results for modeling attack/defense behaviors for achieving high survivability of military mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). Our methodology consists of 3 steps. The first step is to model adversary behavior of capture attackers and inside attackers which can dynamically and adaptively trigger the best attack strategies while avoiding detection and eviction. The second step is to model defense behavior of defenders utilizing intrusion detection and tolerance strategies to reactively and proactively counter dynamic adversary behavior. We leverage game theory to model attack/defense dynamics with the players being the attackers/defenders, the actions being the attack/defense strategies identified, and the payoff for each outcome being related to system survivability. The 3rd and final step is to identify and apply proper solution techniques that can effectively and efficiently analyze attack/defense dynamics as modeled by game theory for guiding the creation of effective defense strategies for assuring high survivability in military MANETs. The end product is a tool that is capable of analyzing a myriad of attacker behaviors and seeing the effectiveness of countering adaptive defense strategies which incorporate attack/defense dynamics.