• DocumentCode
    3718827
  • Title

    Rogue Z-Wave controllers: A persistent attack channel

  • Author

    Jonathan D. Fuller;Benjamin W. Ramsey

  • Author_Institution
    Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH 45433 USA
  • fYear
    2015
  • Firstpage
    734
  • Lastpage
    741
  • Abstract
    The popularity of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) is increasing in critical infrastructure, smart metering, and home automation. Of the numerous protocols available, Z-Wave has significant potential for growth in WSNs. As a proprietary protocol, there are few research publications concerning Z-Wave, and thus little is known about the security implications of its use. Z-Wave networks use a gateway controller to manage and control all devices. Vulnerabilities have been discovered in Z-Wave gateways, all of which rely on the gateway to be consistently connected to the Internet. The work herein introduces a new vulnerability that allows the injection of a rogue controller into the network. Once injected, the rogue controller maintains a stealthy, persistent communication channel with all inadequately defended devices. The severity of this type of attack warrants mitigation steps, presented herein.
  • Keywords
    "Logic gates","Protocols","Wireless sensor networks","Home automation","Security","Wireless LAN","Internet"
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Local Computer Networks Conference Workshops (LCN Workshops), 2015 IEEE 40th
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/LCNW.2015.7365922
  • Filename
    7365922