False data injection attacks with local topology information against linear state estimation

False data injection attacks (FDIAs) have been introduced as a critical class of cyber attacks against smart grid´s monitoring system. These attacks aim to compromise the reading of grid sensors and phasor measurement units. It was shown that FDIAs can pass the traditional bad data detection. Furthermore, to perform an FDIA, the attacker need to acknowledge the power grid topology and transmission-line admittance value, which is not easy to obtain. In this paper, we propose a novel false data injection attack approach, called false data proportional attacks (FDPAs), which could avoid the traditional bad data detection method and do not need the transmission-line admittance value, but only local grid topology. When the measurement of a bus and transmission-line data is changed, simultaneously inject the same false data proportionally for all the buses and transmission-line that are connected to it. We demonstrate the success of these attacks with simulation by IEEE 30-bus test systems.