• DocumentCode
    3743151
  • Title

    Finite-horizon dynamic games for a class of nonlinear stochastic systems

  • Author

    Hiroaki Mukaidani;Hua Xu;Vasile Dragan;Toru Yamamoto

  • Author_Institution
    Graduate School of Engineering, Hiroshima University, 1-4-1 Kagamiyama, Higashi-Hiroshima, 739-8527 Japan
  • fYear
    2015
  • Firstpage
    519
  • Lastpage
    524
  • Abstract
    This paper investigates finite-time horizon dynamic games for a class of nonlinear stochastic systems with multiple players. First, the necessary conditions for the existence of an open-loop Nash equilibrium are established using the stochastic maximum principle. Such conditions can be represented as the solvability conditions of cross-coupled forward-backward stochastic differential equations (CFBSDEs). Second, in order to obtain the open-loop Nash strategy set, a computational algorithm based on a four-step scheme is developed. As an alternative non-cooperative game, a Pareto-based Stackelberg game is also considered. Finally, a practical control example for reducing algal blooms in lake ecosystems is demonstrated to show the validity of the proposed method.
  • Keywords
    "Games","Stochastic systems","Nash equilibrium","Pareto optimization","Differential equations","Lakes","Ecosystems"
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Decision and Control (CDC), 2015 IEEE 54th Annual Conference on
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/CDC.2015.7402281
  • Filename
    7402281