DocumentCode :
3743151
Title :
Finite-horizon dynamic games for a class of nonlinear stochastic systems
Author :
Hiroaki Mukaidani;Hua Xu;Vasile Dragan;Toru Yamamoto
Author_Institution :
Graduate School of Engineering, Hiroshima University, 1-4-1 Kagamiyama, Higashi-Hiroshima, 739-8527 Japan
fYear :
2015
Firstpage :
519
Lastpage :
524
Abstract :
This paper investigates finite-time horizon dynamic games for a class of nonlinear stochastic systems with multiple players. First, the necessary conditions for the existence of an open-loop Nash equilibrium are established using the stochastic maximum principle. Such conditions can be represented as the solvability conditions of cross-coupled forward-backward stochastic differential equations (CFBSDEs). Second, in order to obtain the open-loop Nash strategy set, a computational algorithm based on a four-step scheme is developed. As an alternative non-cooperative game, a Pareto-based Stackelberg game is also considered. Finally, a practical control example for reducing algal blooms in lake ecosystems is demonstrated to show the validity of the proposed method.
Keywords :
"Games","Stochastic systems","Nash equilibrium","Pareto optimization","Differential equations","Lakes","Ecosystems"
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Decision and Control (CDC), 2015 IEEE 54th Annual Conference on
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/CDC.2015.7402281
Filename :
7402281
Link To Document :
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