DocumentCode
3743772
Title
Quadratic two-team games
Author
Marcello Colombino;Tyler H. Summers;Roy S. Smith
Author_Institution
Automatic Control Laboratory, ETH Zurich, Switzerland
fYear
2015
Firstpage
4557
Lastpage
4562
Abstract
We consider stochastic quadratic two-player games where each player represents a team of agents subject to information constraints. We present conditions that guarantee the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium in the space of linear decentralized policies and we provide an iterative algorithm to compute such an equilibrium. The results are illustrated on a numerical example inspired from power systems security.
Keywords
"Games","Hilbert space","Nash equilibrium","Context","Periodic structures","Decision theory"
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Decision and Control (CDC), 2015 IEEE 54th Annual Conference on
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/CDC.2015.7402931
Filename
7402931
Link To Document