DocumentCode
376311
Title
Empirical evidence of strategic bidding in California ISO real-time market
Author
Sheffrin, Anjali
Volume
1
fYear
2001
fDate
15-19 July 2001
Abstract
This study builds on previous studies by the California Independent System Operator Corporation\´s Department of Market Analysis ("DIVIA") indicating that prices in the California electricity markets have persisted at high levels indicative of significant exercise of market power in the California wholesale energy markets. This particular study examines bids by individual suppliers (both instate and importers) in the real-time imbalance energy market of the ISO in order to determine whether individual suppliers\´ behaviors were responsible for raising prices above competitive levels. Resolving that issue affirmatively, it then explains how suppliers successfully employed bidding strategies to insure high market clearing prices. The evidence described in this study thus provides a direct link between the observed pattern of prices and the bidding behavior of individual suppliers that produced those prices.
Keywords
commerce; electricity supply industry; power system economics; tariffs; California; USA; electricity prices; independent system operator; market power; real-time electricity market; strategic bidding; wholesale energy markets; Costs; Couplings; Electricity supply industry; Energy resolution; ISO; Power generation; Power markets; Power system economics; Regulators; Scheduling;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Power Engineering Society Summer Meeting, 2001
Conference_Location
Vancouver, BC, Canada
Print_ISBN
0-7803-7173-9
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/PESS.2001.970098
Filename
970098
Link To Document