• DocumentCode
    376311
  • Title

    Empirical evidence of strategic bidding in California ISO real-time market

  • Author

    Sheffrin, Anjali

  • Volume
    1
  • fYear
    2001
  • fDate
    15-19 July 2001
  • Abstract
    This study builds on previous studies by the California Independent System Operator Corporation\´s Department of Market Analysis ("DIVIA") indicating that prices in the California electricity markets have persisted at high levels indicative of significant exercise of market power in the California wholesale energy markets. This particular study examines bids by individual suppliers (both instate and importers) in the real-time imbalance energy market of the ISO in order to determine whether individual suppliers\´ behaviors were responsible for raising prices above competitive levels. Resolving that issue affirmatively, it then explains how suppliers successfully employed bidding strategies to insure high market clearing prices. The evidence described in this study thus provides a direct link between the observed pattern of prices and the bidding behavior of individual suppliers that produced those prices.
  • Keywords
    commerce; electricity supply industry; power system economics; tariffs; California; USA; electricity prices; independent system operator; market power; real-time electricity market; strategic bidding; wholesale energy markets; Costs; Couplings; Electricity supply industry; Energy resolution; ISO; Power generation; Power markets; Power system economics; Regulators; Scheduling;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Power Engineering Society Summer Meeting, 2001
  • Conference_Location
    Vancouver, BC, Canada
  • Print_ISBN
    0-7803-7173-9
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/PESS.2001.970098
  • Filename
    970098