Keynote Speech VIII by Song Guo

Summary form only given. The paradigm of cloud computing has spontaneously prompted a wide interest in auction-based mechanisms for cloud resource allocation. To eliminate market manipulation, a number of strategy-proof cloud auction mechanisms have been recently proposed by enforcing bidders to bid their true valuations of the cloud resources. However, as discovered in this talk, they would suffer from a new cheating pattern, named false-name bids, where a bidder can gain profit by submitting bids under multiple fictitious names (e.g., multiple email addresses). To tackle this issue, we propose FAITH, a new false-name-proof auction for virtual machine instance allocation, that is proven both strategy-proof and false-name-proof by our theoretical analysis. We also show that FAITH highly improves auction efficiency, outperforming the extended mechanisms of conventional false-name-proof auctions in terms of both revenue and social welfare.